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Most people would likely agree that Europe suffers from a growth 
slowdown. The GDP growth in Europe has lagged behind the GDP growth 
in the US and has been far worse than the GDP growth in the Newly 
Industrialized Countries, particularly China (cf. Figure 2-1 for the US-
Europe comparison). Quite clearly, there is a declining trend in economic 
growth rates for Europe during the post-WWII period; although there are 
substantial growth differences among European countries, the overall 
trend is similar for all of the EU countries (Figure 2-2). During 1998–
2011, GDP has grown by 1.7% annually in EU-27 and 1.5% annually in 
the euro-area. Moreover, these numbers are misleadingly high, given that 
in most EU/EMU countries, fiscal expansion exaggerates the true 
equilibrium growth rate.1 The growth prospects appear no better for 
Europe; the estimates of annual GDP growth for the near future are in the 
one per cent range, and the long-term prospects are sometimes even worse 
due to poor demographic developments (see Figure 2-8 for several 
extreme examples). 
However, what is the reason for slow or rapid economic growth? 
Growth theory does not provide us with a clear answer to this question. To 
phrase this conclusion in a different manner, the story is far from simple, 
as one may agree after consulting, for example, Acemoglu (2009). The 
classical Solow model states that it is (exogenous) technological progress 
that can keep output growing in the long run (in the short run, capital 
deepening can also produce output growth; however, diminishing returns 
will eventually make increased capital impotent). The new growth theory 
provides a somewhat more optimistic perspective for growth policies. 
However, alternative versions of this new growth theory generate different 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Snower et al. (2011) for an illustration of how to compute the impact of 
unsustainable fiscal policy on output growth and obtain an estimate of the 
corresponding equilibrium growth path. 
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recommendations. In particular, according to the AK model, the way to 
sustain high growth rates is to save a large fraction of GDP, a portion of 
which will find its way into financing a higher rate of technological 
progress and thereby stimulate faster growth. By contrast, the 
Schumpeterian view states that innovation and therefore productivity 
growth and convergence can be fostered by the following measures: better 
protection of (intellectual) property rights, which improves the extent to 
which successful innovators can appropriate the rents from their 
innovations; better financial development, which provides easier financing 
of new and innovative ideas; a higher stock of educated labour, which 
improves the ability of individuals either to imitate more advanced 
technologies or to innovate; and macroeconomic stability, which ensures 
low (risk-adjusted) equilibrium interest rates and encourages individuals to 
engage in long-term growth-enhancing investments (cf., e.g., Aghinon and 
Durlauf 2007). These recommendations are sensible, and to a certain 
extent, they are incorporated into the various programs that have been 
created to stimulate growth in Europe (cf., e.g., EU Commission 2010).2 
However, the recommendations are rather abstract, and it is not easy to 




Fig. 2-1 GDP growth rates in the EU and in the US 
Source: AMECO database 
 
                                                          
2 The Commission program attempts to incorporate all possible issues, and 
therefore it produces results that are not very concrete but are instead a collection 
of aims and intentions. 
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The poor growth numbers have, however, prompted various attempts 
to quantify the importance of possible growth factors (see, e.g., Collingnon 
2011 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1998). The assessment of growth factor 
importance is also the purpose of this paper. What makes this paper 
somewhat different from most previous analyses is its emphasis on “deep” 
background variables. Thus, rather than examining the national accounts 
numbers to evaluate factors such as exports and investment, we attempt to 
discover the relationships between key institutional and structural 
variables and the growth of output. To a certain extent, our variables 
correspond to those of the growth factors of the aforementioned “new 
growth theory”, but one cannot really characterise the empirical analysis 
as a test of this theory. As mentioned, we focus only on the EU countries 
in this study, and therefore the special features of developing countries do 




Fig. 2-2 Range of cross-country growth rates of GDP 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
 
Thus, we attempt to quantify the importance of several commonly 
presented explanations for the slowdown of growth in Europe, beginning 
with the (poor) functioning of the labour market, the (adverse) 
development of price competitiveness and the (excessive) growth of 
government. In many respects, the labour market plays the key role in the 
economy because it determines both the use of the labour input and the 
level of overall competitiveness of a nation. Obviously, the functioning of 
the labour market is not independent of the public sector. A large 
government is almost inevitably associated with a large tax wedge, and the 
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functioning of the labour market appears to be critically dependent on the 
size of the tax wedge. It may be fair to say that the harmful consequences 
of a high tax wedge are exceptionally well and unambiguously 
documented in the literature (see, e.g., OECD 2006).3 
The empirical model uses certain alternative indicators for these 
institutional and structural factors. The idea is that these factors affect 
growth via productive inputs and (total factor) productivity. Thus, we do 
not attempt to identify any behavioural relationships, and we therefore 
have no (testable) parametric restrictions. Obviously, the estimates can be 
interpreted as the outcomes of a reduced form model; however, the “door 
is left open” for alternative interpretations and conclusions. 
With respect to the structure of the remainder of the paper, the 
estimating equation is introduced in section 2, and the corresponding 
estimation results are reviewed in section 3. Finally, several concluding 
remarks are provided in section 4. 
2. The model 
To predict the GDP growth g  ( )log(yΔ= ), we utilise the following 









where the variables on the right-hand side of the equation are as follows: 
• The wage share, ws  (the inverse of the profit share)  
• The real exchange rate, fx  (an increase in fx  implies an 
appreciation in the exchange rate) 
• The gross tax rate, tax  (or gov. expenditures, govexp )  
• The (needs-weighted) dependency ratio, dep  
• Average working hours (HP trend), hours 4 
• The terms of trade ( tt ) 
• The real interest rate, rr  (in terms of bond yields)  
• The error term ( u ). 
                                                          
3 The OECD study arrives at very high employment (and unemployment) estimates 
resulting from the size of the tax wedge. Thus, for prime-age males, the elasticity 
of this factor was 0.3 and for prime-age females, the elasticity of this factor was 
0.5. 
4 The HP trend is used to diminish the importance of the simultaneous cyclical 
(demand for labour) relationship between output and working hours. 
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With respect to the coefficient values, we expect 
0,0,0,0,0,0 654321 >><<<< aaaaaa  and 07 <a . 
For the wage share, we have two proxies. One of these proxies is a 
simple income-share of (gross) wages, which is denoted by ws , and the 
other proxy is an adjusted wage share, aws , which accounts for the 
difference between the total number of (paid) employees and total 
employment. Similarly, the size of government is measured both by the 
gross tax rate and by total expenditures with respect to GDP, govexp . 
Finally, competitiveness is measured not only by the real exchange rate 
fx  but also by the (real) unit labour costs, ulc . 
As a final check, we introduced a measure of high-tech industries into 
the model. This hightech variable represents the share of high industries of 
the value added of the total manufacturing industry. We would obviously 
expect that a more advanced structure of the economy allows for higher 
growth rates of exports and total output. 
We use annual data from 15 EU countries for this study. The data span 
the 1971–2011 period, and include a total of 375 data points. With the 
hightech variable, only 253 data points were available. The main data 
source is the AMECO data bank, although dep  values were obtained from 
the DICE data bank, values of the US GDP = USG (used as a control) 
were obtained from the NBER, the unadjusted ws  values were obtained 
from OECD data, and the adjusted wage share ( aws ) data were obtained 
from AMECO. The hightech variable was derived from the OECD Stan 
database and it included the following ISIC categories: 3825 (office 
machinery & computers), 383 (electric machinery), 3845 (aerospace), and 
385 (scientific industries); see Viren and Malkamäki (2002) for details. 
The data for dep and hours (which are not frequently used in empirical 
analyses) are illustrated in Figures 2-4 and 2-5. Both of these variables 
evince a great deal of variability over time. The average working hours 
variable demonstrates more trend-like development, whereas the 
dependency ratio undergoes several long swings that correspond to various 
occurrences, such as demographic changes and changes in pension 
systems. 
The estimates of the model are presented in Table 2-A1. The model is 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), or generalised method of 
moments (GMM) in the case of dynamic panel settings (Arellano – Bond 
estimator). Additional variables in the model include the US GDP growth 
rate (USG ) and the lagged dependent variable (g–1). In most cases, we 
have included cross-section fixed effects (in one instance, fixed time 
effects are also included), although these effects are not displayed. 
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However, to indicate the flavour of the result, we report one set of 
estimates for the cross-section fixed effects in Figure 2-7 (which 
correspond to equation (2-4) in Table 2-A1). If the model included either 
period fixed effects or US GDP growth, the terms of trade variable, tt , 
became insignificant; thus, this variable is not included in the equations 
that are reported in Table 2-A1 (see, however, the results in Boxes 2-1 
and 2-2). 
Obviously, the cross-section fixed effects are not completely innocent 
because they capture most of the cross-sectional variance of output 
growth. Given the approach of the current paper, only the cross-sectional 
variation is of primary interest because we wish to know the determinants 
of the equilibrium growth rate, rather than the factors affecting cyclical 
(short-term) variations in output. It would therefore be useful to present at 
least one set of estimates that includes no fixed effects but only has a 
common constant term. Thus, we ask whether our explanatory variables 
can explain all of the changes (differences) in the examined GDP growth 
rates. This set of results is displayed below in Box 1. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is illustrated by computing the growth rate responses to an 
increase of one standard deviation in each right-hand-side variable 
(Figure 2-6). 
Because we have so many alternative proxies available for functional 
income distribution, price competitiveness, and the size of the government, 
we created an additional experiment in which all of these variables are 
introduced into the estimating equation at the same time. The idea is 
simply to determine how robust the model is in terms of the measurements 
of different factors. The results are displayed in Box 2-2 in the Appendix. 
In this study, we almost entirely report results that represent common 
coefficients for all countries (and years). However, we also estimate the 
models for individual countries. In the cases of individual countries, we 
are primarily interested in examining which types of convergence patterns 
can be detected from the data. An idea of the dispersion of data for 
individual countries can be obtained from Figures 2-2 and 2-3, which 
show the range of growth rates for the examined countries and the 
relationship between the standard deviations of growth rates and the mean 
growth rate. On the basis of these figures, it is a bit difficult to perceive 
that the dispersion would change over time (for instance, during the course 
of the EMU period), whereas it is easy to observe that the dispersion of 
growth rates is strongly related to the mean growth rates. This observation,  
 




Fig. 2-3 Mean and standard deviation of growth rates 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
Note: The mean and the standard deviations are derived for the cross-section data 




Fig. 2-4 The median dependency ratio in the EU 
Source: Author’s calculation based on DICE database 
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in turn, suggests that individual countries differ greatly in terms of output 
shocks, which is a phenomenon that creates obvious problems for common 








Fig. 2-5 The average working hours in the EU 
Source: OECD/MEI database 
 
Box 2-1 
The estimates of the simplest equation 
Growth rate of GDP =  
069.0−  ( 66.3 ) The wage share (t-ratio) 
053.0−  ( 48.3 ) The real exchange rate 
067.0−  ( 85.2 ) The government size (expenditures/GDP) 
006.0+  ( 61.0 ) The HP trend of average working hours (log) 
201.0−  ( 91.2 ) The needs-weighted dependency ratio  
015.0−  ( 20.0 ) The real interest rate  
033.0+  ( 13.1 ) The terms of trade 
374.0+  ( 35.5 ) constant  
242.02 =R ; 021.0=SSE , 168.1=DW ;  
OLS with no fixed & random effects 
Source: AMECO database 
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3. Interpretations of the results 
 
Overall, our simple model fits the data very well. In general, the 
coefficients have the correct signs and are of reasonable magnitude. 
Moreover, the results that are obtained are quite precise, which allows us 




Fig. 2-6 Growth effects of one standard deviation increase in exogenous variables 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: The values are related to estimates in Box 2-1. 
 
The results also appear to be surprisingly robust in terms of various 
measures of the underlying variables (Box 2-A1). Thus, if we construct an 
extreme version of the model and include all alternative proxies of our 
variables, the only coefficient with an unexpected sign is the coefficient of 
the gross tax rate. This result clearly reflects the fact that the gross tax rate 
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and the expenditures/GDP ratio are sufficiently similar that the coefficients 
of both variables cannot be correctly estimated from a single equation. 
The reported cross-section fixed effects (Figure 2-7) demonstrate that 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are the poor performers among the 15 
countries examined (even after controlling for the background variables). 
By contrast, the Nordic countries manage quite well. This finding may 
provide support for various interpretations of the observed differences, 
including distinctions in the quality of institutions, moral values and/or the 
credibility of economic policies.5 Regarding convergence, there appears to 
be unconditional (but not conditional) convergence in terms of GDP.6 With 
respect to other variables, the evidence is rather inconclusive. In terms of 
unit labour costs, certain striking exceptions can be detected (see Table 2-
A2 in Appendix). 
On the basis of the estimates derived in this study, the following guide 
for growth policies appears to be warranted: Keep the profit rate and the 
price competitiveness at a reasonable level (or improve them). Do not 
over-expand the welfare state. Larger governments are associated with 
slower growth rates.7 Secure a sufficient labour supply. Longer workweeks 
generate better economic growth. Do not allow interest rates to exceed 
equilibrium levels, but instead keep the risk premiums as low as possible. 
Try to achieve a more advanced structure of production and exports. 
Clearly, these recommendations largely match the recommendations 
that are provided by the new growth theory, despite the fact that we do not 
directly control variables that directly affect innovative activities. The only 
exception is the output share of high-tech industries (hightech). Including 
this variable does not, however, invalidate the other results and the 
variable makes a positive contribution to the explanation of differences in 
growth. The systematically positive and rather precise coefficient 
estimates suggest that countries that have managed to modernize their 
                                                          
5 These interpretations obviously enter a topic that is rather thoroughly analysed by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1998). 
















, where ge  refers to Germany, was calculated to 
be 043.−  ( 26.3 ) in the unconditional convergence regression; however, if this 
variable is inserted, e.g., to equation (4) in Table 2-A1 as an additional regressor, 
the resulting coefficient is 019.−  ( 75.0 ). 
7 This conclusion may be motivated by the idea that the there is a type of Laffer 
curve in the productivity of public sector services, as discussed by Koskela and 
Viren (2000). This notion also arises in the analysis of the extensive empirical 
evidence that was produced by Tanzi and Shuhknecht (2000). 
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industries seem to perform better than countries that stick to their old 




Fig. 2-7 Cross-section fixed effects 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: These estimates are derived from equation 4 in Table 2-A1 and they 
represent a level-difference from predictions of the respective model. 
 
From a policy perspective, our explanatory variables provide a plethora 
of possibilities for growth programs. These possibilities may be illustrated 
using the following simple calculation, which will at least provide an idea 
of the relevant magnitudes of various effects. Take the simplest equation 
reported in Box 2-1. Using the mean values of the time series for each 
variable, this equation implies that one may increase the mean growth rate 
from 2.4% to 3.4% by changing the right-hand-side variables in the 
following way: 
 
• Wage share: 66%  61% 
• Government expenditure share: 48%  43% 
How to Accelerate Growth in Europe? 
 
30
• (Annual) working hours: 1600 h  1700 h 
• Dependency ratio: 24%  23% 
• Real interest rate 3%  2%. 
 
This result implies that a revolution is not required to generate one per 
cent of additional growth each year: the “welfare state” does not need to 
be eliminated, wages do not need to be lowered to subsistence income 
levels, and working hours do not need to be increased to medieval levels. 
In fact, in most instances, significant improvements in economic growth 
could be produced by simply reverting to the conditions of approximately 
one decade ago. The changes that would be entailed in this reversion are 
still sufficiently great that they would not easily be sold to the general 
public within the median voter model. Given the gloomy prospects of 
most EU countries (Figure 2-8), however, the need for certain unpleasant 




Fig. 2-8 Long-run forecasts of the dependency ratios 
Source: Eurostat 2007 projections (European Commission 2007) 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper shows that accelerating growth in Europe is not completely 
unrealistic. However, several unpopular reforms would be required to 
increase the labour supply, alleviate tax burdens and increase 
competitiveness. Obviously, these phenomena are not unrelated. Thus, by 
reducing the growth of the public sector and decreasing tax rates, one may 
increase both the labour supply and the competitiveness of the private 
sector. The future development of the public sector is indeed the key 
aspect of determining the future development of the economy. If the public 
sector can be maintained in a reasonable fashion, one may manage to 
achieve low tax rates and low tax wedges in labour markets, and one can 
also avoid fiscal crises and keep the risk premiums (of interest rates) low. 
Indeed, there are causal relationships in the opposite direction, as well; for 
instance, an increased labour supply (well-functioning labour markets) 
generates more tax revenues, allowing for lower tax rates and diminishes 
the risks of fiscal crises. 
Although the message of this paper is clear and the results of the 
empirical analysis are quite unambiguous, there are several caveats that 
merit mention. Above all, it is worth noting that in this study, we have not 
considered either capital deepening (increasing investment and saving 
activity) or various other factors that may underlie total factor productivity, 
such as innovative activity and the adaptation of innovations, in any detail 
(cf. Kilponen and Viren (2010) for an assessment of the importance of 
these factors). Similarly, financial factors related to economic growth must 
be more deeply analysed (in accordance with the approach of, for 
example, Beck et al. (2005)). We also have not considered the implications 
of global developments, although these developments obviously affect the 
economic position of European countries relative to other countries. Our 
rather crude institutional and structural explanatory variables do not 
capture any of these considerations particularly well, and thus further 
analysis is certainly required. 
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Panel data estimates with all alternative measures in the same 
equation 
Growth rate of GDP =  
054.0−  ( 27.2 ) The wage share (t-ratio)  
035.0−  ( 04.2 ) The adjusted wage share  
006.0+  ( 76.0 ) The terms of trade  
038.0−  ( 63.2 ) The real exchange rate 
063.0−  ( 52.2 ) The unit labour costs  
182.0+  ( 80.3 ) The gross tax rate   
138.0−  ( 88.3 ) The government size 
(expenditures/GDP)  
029.0+  ( 85.1 ) The HP trend of average working 
hours (log) 
297.0−  ( 27.4 ) The needs-weighted dependency ratio  
062.0−  ( 88.0 ) The real interest rate  
571.0+  ( 53.7 ) The US GDP growth rate  
846.2+  ( 04.1 ) constant  
529.02 =R ; 016.0=SSE , 346.1=DW ;  
OLS with no fixed & random effects 
Note: See Box 2-1 for other details. 
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Table 2-A1 Estimation results 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.27 -0.126
(4.63) (3.17)
-0.309 -0.211 -0.297 -0.137 -0.179 -0.237 -0.191 -0.745 -0.213
(4.23) (3.63) (4.77) (1.47) (3.04) (4.41) (3.75) (2.43) (3.23)
fx -0.038 -0.033 -0.043 -0.038 -0.03 -0.03 -0.035 -0.038 -0.015 -0.019
log (2.35) (2.37) (2.94) (2.30) (2.65) (2.27) (2.42) (2.75) (0.39) (1.23)
-0.137
(4.68)
-0,015 -0.143 -0.112 -0.065 -0.1 -0.152 -0.225 -0.116
(0.38) (2.63) (2.00) (1.12) (1.93) (2.95) (1.15) (2.22)
-0.142 -0.085 -0.082
(4.69) (2.88) (2.29)
hours 0.082 0.071 0.0433 0.027 0.071 0.059 0.038 0.042 0.027 0.089 0.057
log (5.03) (2.83) (1.84) (1.82) (2.64) (0.19) (1.54) (2.44) (1.14) (1.03) (1.91)
-0.081 -0.166 -0.037 -0.18 -0.162 -0.179 -0.094 -0.008 -0.042 -0.032 -0.131
(1.46) (2.87) (0.54) (3.20) (2.89) (2.30) (1.77) (0.13) (0.65) (0.74) (1.76)
-0.245 -0.369 0.019 -0.036 -0.286
(2.15) (3.10) (0.20) (1.15) (2.24)
0.589 0.692 0.643 0.646 0.57 0.665 0.591 0.634 0.441 0.345
(7.97) (8.52) (8.11) (7.82) (7.48) (6.65) (8.35) (8.03) (4.70) (4.46)
0.303
(1.90)
0.347 0.303 0.232 0.251 0.411
(4.51) (5.49) (3.02) (3.89 (3.13)
pane l CS CS CS CS CS CS&T S CS CS CS .. CS
R2 0.529 0.495 0.526 0.505 0.561 0.787 0.579 0.595 0.576 .. 0.41
SEE 0.0171 0.0166 0.0161 0.0165 0.0157 0.0115 0.0152 0.0159 0.0152 0.0177 0.0133












.. .. .. .. .. .. 7.41 (14)
rr
 
Source: AMECO database 
Numbers inside parentheses are corrected t-ratios. CS denotes cross-section fixed 
effects and TS period fixed effects (test statistics for the cross-section fixed effects 
always exceed conventional critical values). Estimates in column (9) are GMM 
estimates. The number of datapoints is 375. However, with equation 10 it is only 
253. 
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Table 2-A2 Convergence of unit labour costs 
 
coefficient t-ratio 















UK -0.018 0.29  
 
Source: AMECO database 
Note: On the first row, we have a common coefficient for all countries and on 
subsequent rows country-specific coefficients. Germany is the reference country in 
both experiments. 
 
 
